Dear Editor,
It was an impeccable exhibition of judicial erudition. Justice Brassington Reynolds in his interpretation of article 177 (2) (b) ruled that the framers of the Constitution meant, and intended to mean by the word “votes” means valid votes.
That learned Judge made it clear that votes carries in its conception, both a quantitative and qualitative understanding. But quality, is a determinant of quantity.
And as I will, convincingly, argue below, the qualitative attribute has a deep, enduring, transcendental meaning and significance in our electoral constitutional jurisprudence. The majority by their two-one ruling has enriched our, perhaps Caribbean, jurisprudence.
Editor, it is this deep, enduring, transcendental qualitative attribute about the people’s vote, that the opposition would by their pious, specious argumentation placing emphasis on quantity only, make a mockery of. What heresy. What great nonsense.
So, I must, per force, explain this deep, enduring, transcendental stuff. It involves some degree of legalistic complexity; but that is unavoidable; bear with me, as this is a matter of profound constitutional ramifications, and, perhaps, unprecedented public concern and unease.
My explanation starts, of course, with article one of our Constitution. Relevantly it reads “Guyana is an …… DEMOCRATIC sovereign State…..”. For an understanding of democratic, I like the way it was articulated by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry in the Privy Council constitutional case of State of Mauritus v. Khoyratty (2007) 1 AC at pages 90,91 thus: “The structure of the Constitution of Mauritus is important. Chapter One provides that Mauritius shall be a sovereign, democratic state: section 1. Mauritus is a parliamentary democracy on the Westminister model……. The idea of a democracy involves a number of different concepts. The first is that the people must decide who should govern them….” Lord Rodger would shudder to think that as with some pretenders of democracy, it involves the concept of the dead being involved in the decision of who should govern! Or fraudsters, by fraudulent contrivances, should make the decision as to who should govern.
And here is my explanation as to democratic deep, enduring, transcendental nature. The supreme law of this land has attached so much value to that concept that not even Parliament by itself (even if all 65 members of the National Assembly unanimously passes a Bill and the President assents to it) could effect any changes to article one of our Constitution, and the concept of “democratic” without the peoples approval in a referendum. (This is what is meant by the legalistic phrase – deepest entrenchment). Naturally, provisions/concepts entrenched by referendum requirement are considered by the framers to be of the highest value, hence their entrenchment by referendum, inter alia. Concepts so valuable, are not to be subverted, impaired, diluted or watered down by fraudulent contrivances, by political neophytes.
Viewed this way, I would submit, that it is axiomatic, and inexorable, that votes which is the linchpin of any democratic electoral process, must mean, must have been intended to mean, and must be understood to mean, valid votes only. And so, if they were minded to be disassociated from unearthed fraudulent contrivances, one would have thought that the opposition, having lost, might have been interested in seeking some clarification from the COA as to the electoral modalities of determining valid votes. But upon deeper analysis and reflection there is a reason for their reluctance, to venture into the sphere of clarification, inspite their propaganda that the PPP/C have won the GREs 2020. The reason is this: votes infected or tainted by their fraudulent contrivances might, conceivably, be unascertainable, positivity, as valid votes. And my understanding of the CoAs ruling is that votes not ascertainable as valid cannot be counted by the CEO. Those would not be valid votes within article 177 (2) (b).
After all, validity is not determinable by some mathematical formula; or by some technology device such as a fuel gauge that tells you when your gas tank is empty, or full (as the case may be). And so in this endeavor, we have resorted to the reliable goal posts of transparency, accountability, verifiability, accuracy, credibility and efficiency (TAVACE) (even at the unavoidable risk of the disenfranchisement of a few) to determine what votes are valid. It seems obvious that it is far better that a few be unwittingly disenfranchised, than that the choice of the majority as to who is the President be defeated and thwarted, by fraudulent contrivances.
And perhaps this fear of valid votes explains why the opposition seek to appeal an UNAPPEALABLE decision of the CoA. What a comedy of error. I offer, pro bono, this advice to Jagdeo – my beleaguered learned friend, Anil Nandlall, is misleading, misguiding and deceiving you. The CCJ has no appellate jurisdiction in this matter. Appellate jurisdiction, where it exists, is wholly a creature of statue. All lawyers know this. It is trite. The statute in this case is the Caribbean Court of Justice Act, 2004 (no 16/2004). So, does it create any jurisdiction in the CCJ in this matter? No. In the plainest, unambiguous words usable, the Act says this under the poignant subtitle “Jurisdiction of the Court” viz “NOTHING IN THIS ACT SHALL confer jurisdiction on the Court to hear matters in relation to ANY DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL which at the time of the entry into force of this Act was declared to be FINAL by ANY LAW” (see section 4 (3)]. Not only is article 177 (4) under which the CoA gave its decision “law”, it is a fortiori, a provision in the supreme law that was in existence ab initio since October 6, 1980. And, it is that self-same article 177 (4) which is a continuing provision (it does not cut off in 2004 upon the coming into force of CCJA in 2004, nor can the CCJA be interpreted inconsistent with the finality intendments of art. 177 (4)) of the supreme law which says the decision shall be “final”). The CCJ, has no jurisdiction whether the decision was made before 2004, or as in the instant case, after 2004. Nor does it matters one jot that the CoAs jurisdiction in art. 177 (4) is original, and not appellate. Why this is so? It is so for this simple reason: in 2004 (30th November) when Jagdeo (as president) assented to the Bill, our CoA was the court of last resort, or the apex court in our Judiciary, there is no appeal from the full bench of the Court of Appeal to another full bench of the Court of Appeal. So, “final” in art 177 (4) must be taken as not permitting action in the High Court by the litigant in the CoA thereafter claiming some breach of constitutional rights by the CoA. How could that ouster of our High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction, in 1980 somehow amount to a creation of a jurisdiction by the CCJA some 24 years later in 2004? Not even Procrustes in Greek mythology could achieve such result! Any appeal is just another false hope foisted on its hapless supporters by a beleaguered opposition. The CCJ ought not to even entertain it for arguments on the jurisdiction point. It is hopeless. It is bound to fail.
I end with this: Votes are either valid, or invalid. An invalid vote cannot be a valid vote. The CEO using the goal post of TAVACE to thwart and defeat fraudulent contrivances decides who we, the people, have chosen to be our President. Neither the Chair, nor GECOM can direct him. And only the CoA can tell the CEO his determination is wrong.
Regards,
Maxwell E. Edwards
Source: https://issuu.com/guyanachroniclee-paper/docs/guyana_chronicle_e-paper_6-24-2020